Post by Chang Sha on Aug 25, 2010 7:45:12 GMT -5
AUGUST 19, 2010, 1:29 A.M. ET
The Chinese Military Challenge. The PLA is seeking to push U.S. forces out of Asian waters.
The Pentagon's annual report on China's military power finally surfaced Monday, five months overdue. Considering that the report tells us little that we didn't already know—not least, that China is rapidly modernizing and expanding its arsenal of missiles, ships and aircraft—we'll put the delay down to the Obama Administration's reluctance to offend Beijing's sensitivities. That may be the most alarming fact of all.
A shift is afoot in the People's Liberation Army's attitude toward the U.S. in Asia. As recently as a few years ago, Chinese officials acknowledged that the American military is a stabilizing force in the region. But while China's civilian leaders still want to enhance military-to-military ties, Chinese officers have become increasingly confrontational, in written statements and deeds.
Exhibit A is the PLA's challenge to the U.S. Navy's right to operate in international waters near China's coast. In response to the announcement this month of new exercises in the Yellow Sea involving the aircraft carrier USS George Washington—something the Navy has been doing for decades—Rear Admiral Yang Yi told an Australian journalist that this was "some kind of challenge and humiliation to China's national interest and the feelings of the Chinese people." After similar protests last month the Pentagon caved, opting to deploy the Washington and its battle group on the other side of the Korean peninsula.
Beijing has also decided to enforce its claim to almost the entire South China Sea as its "historical waters," identifying this as a "core interest" on a par with Taiwan and Tibet. Early last year, Chinese patrol vessels and trawlers mounted a coordinated effort to intimidate an unarmed U.S. Navy surveillance ship. China has been equipping its fisheries service with ex-Navy ships to enforce a summer fishing ban in the South China Sea. In June, one such ship was involved in a confrontation with the Indonesian navy off the Natuna Islands.
China's broader strategic goal is to keep the U.S. from operating freely in the waters bounded by Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines and Indonesia. Beijing's strategy, known as "access denial," involves fielding a large submarine force, developing cruise and ballistic missiles that could take out an American aircraft carrier, and deploying antisatellite weapons that can disrupt U.S. communications. These and other forms of "asymmetric" military capabilities are intended to prevent the U.S. Navy from gaining access to these waters in the event that, say, China decides to bully Taiwan into accepting reunification on Beijing's terms.
Underlying this assertiveness is an assumption that the day the PLA can take on the U.S. may not be far off. While the U.S. retains a technological edge, China has noticed that the U.S. Navy now fields fewer than 300 ships, or half of its numbers after the Reagan arms build-up, and that it is likely to suffer from further budget cutting under Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who in May warned that the Navy would "have to accept some hard fiscal realities." Much the same goes for the Air Force, which is flying decades-old bombers, fighter jets and refueling tankers as modernization programs are drastically scaled back (as with the F-22) or endlessly delayed (as with the KC-X tanker).
Little wonder, then, that China's neighbors are increasingly nervous. Chinese assertiveness has so far created a diplomatic boon for Washington, with Seoul tightening its military alliance with the U.S., Japan backing down from its attempt to renege on an agreement to move a U.S. military base in Okinawa, and even Vietnam drawing closer to the U.S. But that will only last as long as the U.S. is seen as a credible guarantor of stability, which is ultimately a function of military strength.
For now, the greatest risk is of Chinese miscalculation, particularly over Taiwan. Chinese missiles have become accurate enough to make precision strikes, leaving the island's airfields particularly vulnerable. A RAND study last year suggested that in a war the Taiwanese air force would be quickly overwhelmed by Chinese fighters. With air superiority lost, an invasion might begin before U.S. reinforcements could even arrive. Such belief is how nations blunder into war.
President Obama began his presidency trying to placate Beijing. He could put relations on a better footing, and diminish the risk of future confrontations, by leaving China's generals in no doubt that the U.S. has the will and wherewithal to defend its friends and interests in the region against all challengers.
reprint from Wall Street Journal
The Chinese Military Challenge. The PLA is seeking to push U.S. forces out of Asian waters.
The Pentagon's annual report on China's military power finally surfaced Monday, five months overdue. Considering that the report tells us little that we didn't already know—not least, that China is rapidly modernizing and expanding its arsenal of missiles, ships and aircraft—we'll put the delay down to the Obama Administration's reluctance to offend Beijing's sensitivities. That may be the most alarming fact of all.
A shift is afoot in the People's Liberation Army's attitude toward the U.S. in Asia. As recently as a few years ago, Chinese officials acknowledged that the American military is a stabilizing force in the region. But while China's civilian leaders still want to enhance military-to-military ties, Chinese officers have become increasingly confrontational, in written statements and deeds.
Exhibit A is the PLA's challenge to the U.S. Navy's right to operate in international waters near China's coast. In response to the announcement this month of new exercises in the Yellow Sea involving the aircraft carrier USS George Washington—something the Navy has been doing for decades—Rear Admiral Yang Yi told an Australian journalist that this was "some kind of challenge and humiliation to China's national interest and the feelings of the Chinese people." After similar protests last month the Pentagon caved, opting to deploy the Washington and its battle group on the other side of the Korean peninsula.
Beijing has also decided to enforce its claim to almost the entire South China Sea as its "historical waters," identifying this as a "core interest" on a par with Taiwan and Tibet. Early last year, Chinese patrol vessels and trawlers mounted a coordinated effort to intimidate an unarmed U.S. Navy surveillance ship. China has been equipping its fisheries service with ex-Navy ships to enforce a summer fishing ban in the South China Sea. In June, one such ship was involved in a confrontation with the Indonesian navy off the Natuna Islands.
China's broader strategic goal is to keep the U.S. from operating freely in the waters bounded by Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines and Indonesia. Beijing's strategy, known as "access denial," involves fielding a large submarine force, developing cruise and ballistic missiles that could take out an American aircraft carrier, and deploying antisatellite weapons that can disrupt U.S. communications. These and other forms of "asymmetric" military capabilities are intended to prevent the U.S. Navy from gaining access to these waters in the event that, say, China decides to bully Taiwan into accepting reunification on Beijing's terms.
Underlying this assertiveness is an assumption that the day the PLA can take on the U.S. may not be far off. While the U.S. retains a technological edge, China has noticed that the U.S. Navy now fields fewer than 300 ships, or half of its numbers after the Reagan arms build-up, and that it is likely to suffer from further budget cutting under Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who in May warned that the Navy would "have to accept some hard fiscal realities." Much the same goes for the Air Force, which is flying decades-old bombers, fighter jets and refueling tankers as modernization programs are drastically scaled back (as with the F-22) or endlessly delayed (as with the KC-X tanker).
Little wonder, then, that China's neighbors are increasingly nervous. Chinese assertiveness has so far created a diplomatic boon for Washington, with Seoul tightening its military alliance with the U.S., Japan backing down from its attempt to renege on an agreement to move a U.S. military base in Okinawa, and even Vietnam drawing closer to the U.S. But that will only last as long as the U.S. is seen as a credible guarantor of stability, which is ultimately a function of military strength.
For now, the greatest risk is of Chinese miscalculation, particularly over Taiwan. Chinese missiles have become accurate enough to make precision strikes, leaving the island's airfields particularly vulnerable. A RAND study last year suggested that in a war the Taiwanese air force would be quickly overwhelmed by Chinese fighters. With air superiority lost, an invasion might begin before U.S. reinforcements could even arrive. Such belief is how nations blunder into war.
President Obama began his presidency trying to placate Beijing. He could put relations on a better footing, and diminish the risk of future confrontations, by leaving China's generals in no doubt that the U.S. has the will and wherewithal to defend its friends and interests in the region against all challengers.
reprint from Wall Street Journal